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Towards a Professions-Based Understanding of Ethical and 
Responsible Lobbying 
Abstract 
Responding to calls for more substantive studies into ethical and responsible lobbying, we 
analyse data collected over a 5-year period in Brussels to explore how individual lobbyists 
understand the ethical dimensions of their work. Mobilising insights from the sociology of the 
professions, we expose an emerging lobbying professionalism, and unpack practitioners’ 
understandings of what being a professional lobbyist entails, focusing in particular on their 
espoused values of transparency and honesty. Whilst expectations to lobby more transparently 
and honestly stem from political institutions, we find individual lobbyists – acting as conduits 
– attempt to disseminate these expectations by setting limits that incite their clients to 
embrace what policymakers consider professional lobbying practice. Our study contributes to 
corporate political activity (CPA) scholarship by providing a professions-based understanding 
of ethical and responsible approaches to lobbying. We provide new insights into contextual 
and individual-level factors behind the emergence of such approaches, and elucidate 
implications of lobbying professionalism for business and EU governance. 
Key words: Corporate political activity; Responsible lobbying; Professionalism; Work ethics; 
Transparency 
 
 
 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, scholars of business and society began exploring more principled 
and ethical forms of lobbying (e.g. Hamilton & Hoch, 1997). In this article, we use the term 
‘lobbying’ in broad terms to cover firms’ corporate political activities, understood as the 
actions undertaken to shape political decisions in ways favourable to firms (Hillman et al., 
2004). Recently, scholars have theorised on related notions including deliberative lobbying – 
understood as the alignment of firms’ political and social actions to resolve public issues 
(Lock & Seele, 2016) – and responsible lobbying – referring to ethically-acceptable political 
actions promoting the social good through public policy (Anastasiadis et al., 2018). This 
emerging literature makes a welcome contribution to corporate political activity (CPA) 
scholarship, which has tended to overlook ethical dimensions of its subject (Lawton et al., 
2013). However, despite these recent advances, we need more substantive studies into ethical 
lobbying and its implications (Anastasiadis et al., 2018).  
We note specifically that – whilst CPA research increasingly acknowledges individual 
lobbyists (e.g. Rudy & Johnson, 2019; Wilts, 2006) – studies into ethical and responsible 
lobbying continue to pay them little attention. Grounded primarily in a normative ethics 
perspective (Fischer, 2004), they prescribe theoretically how responsible lobbying should be 
conducted, without considering lobbyists’ own understandings of ethical or responsible 
practice. Lobbyists tend to be reduced to unquestioning individuals whose actions are 
influenced solely by corporate cultures and priorities (Anastasiadis, 2014). They are 
overlooked as important translators of systemic expectations regarding responsible lobbying 
in organisations they represent (e.g. Bauer, 2017). 
In our view, lobbying practitioners should not be underestimated in the study of 
lobbying. They are not passive vessels of corporate will, nor mere executors of firms’ political 
preferences (Tyllström & Murray, 2019). We thus seek to place them at the centre of our 
analysis to stretch theoretical understandings of ethical and responsible lobbying. Embracing 
a descriptive ethics perspective that foregrounds practitioners’ moral behaviour and beliefs 
(Fischer, 2004), we analyse data gathered over a 5-year period in Brussels to investigate what 
lobbyists personally consider to be professionalism in lobbying, including its ethical 
dimensions. We find that practitioners combine claims to specific values (chiefly, 
transparency and honesty) and expertise to enhance their personal reputations and improve 
their access to EU-level policymakers. Their value claims and expertise also serve to increase 
legitimacy within their firms and set limits on client and employer expectations regarding 
lobbying. We explain our findings using insights from the sociology of the professions – a 
theoretical approach emphasising the link between work ethics and expertise and the 
instrumental role of value and expertise claims for practitioners. In so doing, we respond to 
calls for more ‘academic research into the professional values held by lobbyists’ (McGrath, 
2005, p.134). Drawing on institutions-based understandings of professionalism, we expose 
lobbyists as institutional conduits (Greif, 2006) who interpret policymakers’ expectations 
regarding transparency and honesty in lobbying, and transmit these to the organisations they 
represent.  
Our article makes three contributions to CPA scholarship. First, we identify 
professionalism in lobbying as an alternative approach to understanding ethical and 
responsible lobbying. Extending insights into the rise of professional lobbying (e.g. Coen and 
Vannoni, 2019), we expose how lobbyists understand what being professional entails, 
especially in terms of transparency and honesty. Second, we highlight that lobbyists 
encourage organisations to embrace these values in their political actions. Instead of taking 
root automatically, professional lobbying practices based on transparency and honesty are 
disseminated by lobbyists who reproduce them in interactions with employers and clients. Our 
research thus builds on existing understandings about conditions that promote ethical and 
responsible lobbying (e.g. Bauer, 2017). Finally, we expose implications of professionalism in 
lobbying. We confirm research (e.g. Doh et al., 2014) suggesting that responsible lobbying 
improves political access. Assuming increased transparency makes for better policymaking 
(e.g. Bunea & Gross, 2019), we suggest that lobbyists’ promotion of professional values may 
enhance the legitimacy of governance in the political systems where they operate.  
We begin our article by reviewing existing research into ethical and responsible 
lobbying and establishing the theoretical basis of our study. Next, we describe our research 
context and methods used for collecting and analysing data. We then present key findings and 
discuss their contribution to prior research. We conclude by establishing our study’s 
limitations and highlighting future research opportunities. 
Lobbying: Instrumental and Ethical Perspectives 
Scholars typically adopt an instrumental view to evaluate firms’ political actions according to 
their private returns for organisations (Schuler, 2008). They have been charged with studying 
firms’ political actions as short-term, profit-generating activities while neglecting the ethical 
aspects of their subject (Alzola, 2013; Mantere et al., 2009). As explained below, ethical 
analyses emerged relatively slowly in lobbying research (Dahan et al, 2013).  
Ethical and Responsible Lobbying: Definitions and Outcomes 
Early research emphasised ethical lobbying, reflecting on appropriate lobbying practices and 
linking lobbying with businesses’ broader responsibility to respect human rights, the health 
and safety of their staff, or democratic institutions (Weber, 1997). Scholars proposed rules for 
managers to consider when evaluating the impact of firms’ political actions on the broader 
public good (Hamilton & Hoch, 1997; Keffer & Hill, 1977). They argued that ethical 
lobbying practice should be underpinned by businesses’ obligation to resolve conflicts of 
interests where public and private interests do not coincide (Oberman, 2004). Whilst not 
considering business lobbying immoral, they suggested that society’s expectations regarding 
ethical lobbying behaviour were legitimate (Ostas, 2007).  
Recently, scholars have proposed other concepts to study ethical dimensions of 
lobbying. Anastasiadis et al. (2018) theorise on responsible lobbying, defined as actions that 
promote social good through public policy and adhere to ethical standards acceptable to all 
parties involved in policymaking. For Bauer (e.g. 2017), responsible lobbying is an 
integrative approach which, akin to Den Hold et al. (2014), aligns firms’ lobbying and CSR 
activities. Lobbying is responsible if it links firms’ public policy positions to the long-term 
objectives and values of society. Similarly stressing alignment of firms’ political and social 
actions, Lock & Seele (2016) develop the concept of deliberative lobbying to encourage firms 
to resolve public issues through principles of discourse, transparency and accountability. 
Notions of ethical and responsible lobbying are also discernible in research into transparency 
in firms’ political actions (Greenwood, 2011; Holman & Luneburg, 2012), enabling society to 
better evaluate the sustainability impacts of firms’ policy positions (Lyon et al. 2018).  
Extant research suggests a positive link between responsible and ethical approaches to 
lobbying and firms’ political and business performance. Aligning lobbying activities with 
CSR actions – although challenging – can safeguard firms’ reputations, stakeholder 
relationships and overall legitimacy (De Hond et al., 2014; Locke & Seele, 2016). 
Responsible lobbying can help avoid ethical transgressions that harm reputation and 
profitability (Barron & Stacey, 2020). It can establish credibility among policymakers and 
contribute to the overall legitimacy (Bauer, 2017). Promoting responsible lobbying through 
the alignment of CPA and CSR activities enables firms to influence political and social actors 
whose decisions can either facilitate or impede competitive success (Doh et al., 2014).  
 
Enabling Conditions of Ethical and Responsible Lobbying 
Scholars have also sought to expose conditions that favour or impede ethical and responsible 
lobbying. Contextual factors can shape lobbying practice, including its ethical dimensions. 
Levine (2009) highlights that, in the US, being polite and respectful towards policy actors and 
doing them favours helps lobbyists maintain access. Woll’s (2012) work on lobbying ‘styles’ 
emphasises how policymaking contexts in Brussels and Washington DC shape lobbyists’ 
communication practices with legislators. Such context-based accounts find an echo in ethical 
and responsible lobbying research. Political institutions can promote more responsible 
lobbying by sanctioning organisations engaged in unethical political behaviour (Lock & 
Seele, 2016). Responsible lobbying can be affected by government systems (parliamentary vs. 
presidential), lobbying systems (pluralist vs. corporatist), political cultures (informal vs.  
formal) and lobbying regulation (state vs. self-regulation) (Bauer, 2017). More transparent 
lobbying can be promoted through macro-level lobbying regulation (Holman & Luneberg, 
2012; Greenwood, 2011). Others argue responsible lobbying may be encouraged at an 
organisational level through governance mechanisms or codes of ethics (e.g. Dahan et al., 
2013; Ozer & Alakent, 2013). It may be promoted through structurally integrating CPA and 
CSR departments in firms to avoid strategic contradiction (Doh et al, 2014: Locke & Seele, 
2016). Firms may also encourage responsible lobbying through organisation design by 
considering how they evaluate and reward lobbyists (Barron & Stacey, 2020).   
The Under-Researched Role of the Individual Lobbyists in Ethical and Responsible Lobbying 
Despite recent advances, understandings of ethical and responsible lobbying remain 
underdeveloped (Anastasiadis et al., 2018; Rival & Major, 2018). Research tends to adopt a 
normative ethics perspective – prescribing beliefs and values and determining what ought to 
be done (Fischer, 2004) – to theorise on how lobbyists should act. Such studies struggle to 
agree on what constitutes ‘ethical’ or ‘responsible’ in relation to lobbying. Ethical or 
responsible lobbying feasibly relate to political actions that support policies to benefit society, 
do not undermine democracy, or result in better financial performance for firms. One way out 
of this impasse may be to adopt a more descriptive ethics perspective, and examine the beliefs 
or values that guide what is customarily done and provide empirical description and 
explanation of lobbyists’ moral behaviour (Fischer, 2004). Drawing on practitioners’ 
narratives that describe their views, concerns and principles guiding their work, such an 
approach would give voice to practicing lobbyists and empirically explore their own 
understandings of ethical and responsible lobbying (McGrath, 2005).  
Focusing on individual lobbyists may also generate new understandings about 
conditions that enable the emergence of ethical and responsible approaches to lobbying. 
Scholars increasingly acknowledge that firms’ lobbying choices can be influenced by 
managers’ identities (Wilts, 2006) or other characteristics like tenure, age, functional or 
educational background (e.g. Rudy & Johnson, 2019). Coen and Vannoni (2018) focus on the 
background and demographic characteristics of lobbying practitioners in Brussels to 
understand how organisations staff government affairs’ departments. Despite these examples, 
research into ethical and responsible lobbying gives little attention to the behaviours of 
individual lobbyists. Anastasiadis (2014), for instance, makes no clear distinction between 
lobbyists and the firms they represent, suggesting responsible lobbying is driven by 
organisational factors alone. He thus reduces practitioners of responsible lobbying to 
unquestioning individuals whose actions are influenced solely by their firms’ cultures and 
priorities. As Tyllström and Murray (2019) argue, lobbyists may be more than passive actors 
and may actually possess agendas and ideological stances at odds with those of their clients.  
Context-based accounts of responsible lobbying (Bauer, 2017) or lobbying 
transparency (Greenwood, 2011; Holman & Luneburg, 2012;) similarly neglect individual 
lobbyists. Institutional pressures can influence firms’ behaviour, but may be ignored in the 
absence of concrete actors who activate them (Greif, 2006). Such pressures do not 
automatically trigger behavioural changes in firms (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). They require 
specific actors to instil them in organisations (Czarniawska, 1997). Context-based research on 
ethical and responsible lobbying overlook the role lobbyists can play as these conduits of 
institutional pressure (Lee, 2011). As our findings will attest, lobbyists face pressures from 
both policymaking environments and organisations they represent. They must walk a fine line 
between the two: understanding, bringing together and – if necessary – reconciling 
expectations of both policymakers and their employers or clients. Drawing on the sociology 
of the professions, we highlight how lobbyists interpret policymakers’ expectations about 
lobbying conduct and translate them into ethical principles that guide firms’ political actions.  
Theoretical Background: Sociology of the Professions 
Scholars have already applied broad insights from the sociology of the professions to explore 
the professionalisation of lobbyists. Some argue that groups representing business interests 
are increasingly professionalised in Brussels (Klüver & Saurugger, 2013). Others counter that 
EU-level lobbyists have become a well-established occupation but fall short of having 
attained professional status (McGrath, 2005). Without necessarily drawing on sociological 
accounts of the professions, scholars increasingly talk about a general professionalisation of 
politics (Selling & Svallfors, 2019) or lobbying professionals (Coen & Vannoni, 2019) 
reflecting on the fact that politics and lobbying have developed into specialist activities. In 
this article, we apply the specific sociological concept of professionalism to generate new 
understandings of lobbying and its ethical dimensions.  
 
 
The Concept of Professionalism 
Professionalism is a distinctive logic of organising work and delivering services (Freidson, 
2001). Emerging from the sociological study of professions in the early 20th century, it has 
been studied in a variety of settings and national contexts (Torstendahl & Burrage, 1990) 
using diverse approaches, such as neo-institutional theory (Muzio et al., 2013), neo-Marxism 
perspectives (Larson,1977) and innovation or knowledge management in organisational 
studies (Alvesson, 1995). Professionalism can be understood as the norms and standards of 
workplace conduct (Vaidyanathan, 2012). It mandates professionals using their expertise to 
produce excellent outcomes.  
Professionalism prescribes that practitioners have technical skills to solve complex 
problems and address unpredictable situations (such as treating patients, representing 
defendants in courts and providing sound commercial advice). Underpinned by formal 
training, rationality and discretion, professional services in business settings are associated 
with added commercial value (Hodgson et al., 2015). Professionalism also involves a moral 
obligation to the person who receives professionals’ services, ranging from the health and 
wellbeing of individuals to the financial sustainability of businesses. Professionals are 
expected ‘to put clients first, to maintain confidentiality and not use their knowledge for 
fraudulent purposes’ (Evetts, 2013, p.780).The competence and skills associated with 
professionalism are thus inextricably linked to professional ethics. Professionalism also 
assumes a commitment to use expertise and create information to the benefit of society. For 
example, medical doctors have a duty both to patients and public health. Similarly, lawyers 
have an obligation towards clients but are also expected to serve the ideal of justice (Horobin, 
1983).  
Professionals are accountable both to their clients and the public interest and expected 
to balance tensions as they arise between the two (Dezalay, 1995; Freidson, 2001). Koehn 
(1994) explains how professionals can balance these tensions by setting limits on clients’ 
expectations. Whilst they need to promote their clients’ interests, professionals cannot 
unconditionally serve their clients’ whims. Doctors should not promote their patients’ health 
by compromising the health of others (such as by transplanting a kidney from a coerced donor 
to save a life). Auditors should not falsify the accounts of their clients. On the one hand, thus, 
professionalism is largely a normative concept (Koehn, 1994). On the other, it is grounded on 
empirical work and sociological analysis. Below, we briefly discuss how professionalism has 
been studied and theorised within the sociology of work, and present recent contributions 
shedding light on professional work through an institutional-theory lens. 
Evolution of the Concept of Professionalism  
Historical analyses considered traditional professionals like doctors, lawyers and accountants 
– given their expertise, moral duty to clients, and promotion of the broader good – to be the 
epitome of professionalism (Evetts, 2013). Analyses since the 1970s took a more critical turn, 
dismissing professionalism as an ideology (Johnson, 1972) used for market closure (Larson, 
1977) and the promotion of occupational self-interests, including status, power and monopoly 
protection of occupational jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988). Throughout the 1990s, scholarly work 
increasingly depicted professionals as experts void of a service ethic (Brint, 1994). Studies 
into professions such as management consultants have revealed the emergence of ‘corporate’ 
or ‘organisational’ professionals who gained status based on a reputation for creating 
commercial value for clients without serving the wider social good (Ackroyd, 2016). These 
professions have been depicted as ‘hollow’ (Kipping, 2011) or subservient to client 
expectations (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000). Such studies into the continuity and change of 
professional values highlight on-going interest in the normative aspects of experts’ work that 
lie at the centre of professionalism (Evetts, 2011). Exploring these issues further, scholars 
have begun studying professionalism through an institutional lens to examine the role of 
professionals in both the creation and dissemination of institutions, not least normative ones 
(see for example, Muzio et al., 2013; Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). 
Professions are supposedly ‘the preeminent institutional agents of our time’ (Scott, 2008, p. 
219). Professionals can act as cognitive agents (providing conceptual tools that help to define 
and frame issues), normative agents (establishing norms and standards) and regulative agents 
(participating in the drafting of sanctionable rules) (Scott, 2008). In orchestrating such 
changes, professionals draw on various dynamics and mechanisms. For example, they can 
create new spaces for their expertise, or populate existing social spaces with new actors 
(Lefsrud and Suddaby, 2012; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Even if professionals are not 
themselves the agents who actively create institutions, they can still act as institutional 
carriers who receive, interpret and diffuse pressures created by others (Scott, 2008). Suchman 
and Cahill (1996) show how business attorneys reproduce normative and cognitive 
understandings of financing processes in Silicon Valley. Hwang and Powell (2009) 
demonstrate how management consultants function as the carriers of rationalisation to non-
profit organisations. Adler and Kwon (2013) highlight individual-level characteristics 
(including autonomy, expertise, values, identities and ties) and organisational-level factors 
(including strategy, structure and culture) that can either facilitate or impede the ability of 
medical practitioners to act as the carriers of clinical guidelines. 
 Professionalism is thus a powerful sociological concept useful for explaining how 
individuals can interpret and respond to cognitive, normative and regulative pressures – even 
when facing competing pressures from their employers or clients. Professionals can handle 
such conflicts by setting limits on the clients’/employers’ expectations of them (Koehn 1994) 
and by delivering excellent outcomes as long as these outcomes do not compromise other 
actors’ wellbeing and do not cause harm to the broader good. Our findings will reveal that 
lobbyists largely have a shared normative understanding of what it means to practice in a 
professional manner. These understandings emerge largely from the wider policymaking 
environment. Whilst not portraying themselves as active institutional agents, our interviewees 
reflect on the challenges they face as institutional carriers as they attempt to diffuse 
professional lobbying practice in the organisations they represent. 
Methods 
Our project began in 2013 as a study of the working practices of lobbyists in Brussels. It 
developed into a 5-year project during which we undertook two rounds of intensive interviews 
and continued to develop a deep understanding of Brussels-based lobbying through archival 
data and regular conversations with practitioners. 
Research Setting – Business Lobbying in Brussels 
Our research focuses on the Brussels context, which provides a rich environment for studying 
lobbying. After Washington DC, Brussels has the second highest density of lobbyists in the 
world. Over 6,200 full-time business lobbyists working for firms, associations or 
consultancies regularly meet EU officials (Transparency International, 2015). Brussels is also 
interesting given changes in the lobbying landscape. As reported in our results, these changes 
have triggered shifts in how lobbyists and officials believe lobbying should be conducted.  
Data Collection 
We collected data from primary and secondary sources. Interviews, described below, were our 
principal data source. Secondary data provided triangulation and supplementary sources for 
understanding our research context and gaining additional perspectives on key issues (Jick, 
1979; Miles & Huberman, 1994). E-mail exchanges and follow-up face-to-face conversations 
with lobbyists helped us obtain feedback on emerging findings.  
We began by gathering articles and interviews published in the specialist EU press, 
including Politico and Euractiv, documentation on lobbying regulations issued by the EU 
institutions, and press releases issued by associations representing occupational interests of 
lobbyists working in Brussels. We also gathered information from websites of advocacy 
groups with an interest in lobbying (e.g., Transparency International, Alter-EU). Secondary 
data enabled us to identify developments – including increased policymaking complexity, and 
the launch of the European Transparency Register – with potential to affect lobbying practice.  
We then conducted two rounds of interviews, first from October 2013 – April 2014, 
and then from May – August 2016. Initial interviews sought to understand how Brussels-
based lobbyists work. They were based on a protocol, inspired by Hillman and Hitt (1999), 
comprising questions on lobbyists’ political objectives, relationships with policymakers, and 
tactics for shaping policy. Professionalism emerged as a strong theme in these first interviews. 
Second-round interviews focused on this issue. Inspired by existing work in the sociology of 
the professions, we aimed to uncover the forces behind lobbyists’ declared professionalism 
and understand its attraction to lobbyists. Questions encouraged interviewees to explain their 
career paths, describe changes in lobbying practice and consider triggers of such changes.  
For both interview rounds, we used the EU’s Transparency Register to identify 
potential interviewees. We contacted over one hundred lobbyists in each round of data 
collection. As is common in research on EU lobbying (e.g. Chalmers, 2014), few agreed to 
participate. Our final sample of 39 informants, reported in Table 1, is nonetheless suitable for 
exploratory research (Robson, 2011). In it, in-house lobbyists outnumber consultants by a 
ratio of 1:6, which is close to the ratio 1:5 documented in the TR register.   
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 1 also indicates interviewees are not necessarily newcomers to Brussels 
lobbying. On average, they have 8.4 years’ experience. We suggest our interviewees are thus 
able to identify temporal changes in EU lobbying. Interviewees’ past experiences can help 
establish a baseline for comparing changes in lobbying practice over time. Concerned that our 
lobbying respondents may tend to portray themselves in a positive light, we sought to increase 
the validity of our data by interviewing officials in the EU institutions and representatives of 
NGOs focused on lobbying in Brussels. Finally, we contacted interviewees again whenever 
we needed clarification on points made during interviews. We also used these informal 
exchanges as a sounding board to discuss emerging patterns in the data. Table 2 summarises 
our data sources and their use in our analysis.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Data Analysis  
We immersed ourselves in the material to develop a feel for the data as a whole. Following 
Nag et al. (2007) and Nag and Gioia (2012), we coded interviews using informants’ in vivo 
expressions, following theme analyses and categorization techniques suggested by Miles & 
Huberman (1994). This helped identify initial first-order concepts in the data. Next, we 
engaged in axial coding, collapsing recurring concepts into themes, i.e. researcher-induced 
concepts representing emergent theoretical concepts (Nag & Gioia, 2012). Finally, we 
assembled themes into aggregate dimensions. Figure 1 presents our final data structure.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
To increase the confidence in our analysis, we followed the guidelines of Lincoln and 
Guba (1985). We triangulated data sources, and – when necessary – gathered additional 
material for confirmatory purposes. We presented our emerging model to industry 
participants. Our different backgrounds (CPA on the one hand, and the sociology of work on 
the other) provided a combination of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ authors, enabling intimacy with 
local settings whilst providing potential for distancing (Langley et al., 2013). 
 
Results 
Contextual Background Information – Developments in Brussels Lobbying 
Our data expose contextual changes affecting lobbying practice in Brussels. One relates to 
increased complexity. The process of European integration throughout the 1990s and into the 
21st century introduced new rules on political decision-making. Progressive treaty changes, 
introduced to deal with an enlarging EU, created a multi-venue decision-making environment 
that interviewees describe as increasingly complicated. Their work more and more involves 
“understanding the different institutions, and recognising for which legal, economic and 
political aspects of EU policy they are responsible” (Interviewee 1). Complexity poses 
practical challenges. It is difficult, for instance, to know which EU institution is the most 
appropriate to approach when addressing specific dossiers (Interviewee 8).  
A second contextual change is a ‘transparency turn’ in EU policymaking. Country-
proponents of transparency – including the Scandinavian states – have since the 1990s 
promoted a desire for openness in EU governance and an agenda of more visible 
policymaking (Gronbeck-Jensen, 1998). A key development is the European Transparency 
Initiative (ETI) of 2005. This assumes transparency is a pre-condition for popular legitimacy. 
Core ETI components cover the ethical behaviour of EU officials and lobby regulation. The 
ETI also created the European Transparency Register (ETR) – a database reporting who 
represents which interests in Brussels, and with what budgets. These two contextual changes 
coincided with the creation of associations representing Brussels-based lobbyists. The Society 
of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP), representing in-house corporate lobbyists was 
founded in 1992 in response to the launch of the European Single Market (Interviewee 24). It 
had just over 300 members at the time of our research. The European Public Affairs 
Consultancies’ Association (EPACA), representing 42 lobbying consultancies, was created 
following the ETI (Interviewee 28).  
Norms and Guiding Principles in Professional Lobbying Practice 
The contextual background sketched out above shapes lobbyists' work practices. 
Interviewees’ depictions of their work reveal a shared normative understanding of what it 
means to lobby professionally. They consider the technical complexity and normative 
ramifications of their activities to be inextricably linked. As developed below, our informants 
share the view that professional competence in EU lobbying involves navigating the complex 
system of EU governance, and effectively communicating political and sectoral knowledge 
with clients. However, they also believe their competence can only be effectively mobilised if 
they are transparent and honest with policymakers. The values of transparency and honesty 
are in effect central to lobbyists' professional moral compass, which (together with their 
competence) helps them secure political access and create value for their clients without 
jeopardising the broader good. 
Competence of professional lobbyists: technical expertise and skills. Informants’ 
understandings of lobbying professionalism are imbued with references to their competence 
(see Table 3).They consciously portray themselves as experts in EU policymaking who know 
the intricacies of an increasingly complex political environment, the best routes for accessing 
policymakers in different institutions, and the appropriateness of lobbying alone or 
collectively. Professional lobbyists stress their political knowledge is complemented by 
technical expertise. They claim traditional lobbyists rely on the specialist expertise of 
colleagues or clients and avoid engaging in technical policy discussions themselves. 
Professional lobbyists, by contrast, are keen to underscore their specialisms. For instance:  
 
“I’ve been involved in a wide range of EU regulatory issues, affecting a variety 
of areas including innovation, telecoms, education, tourism, the circular 
economy and health.” (Interviewee 26) 
 
They also distinguish themselves from traditional lobbyists through their skills. They consider 
traditional lobbyists have relational skills which – although useful in the past – may prevent 
fostering meaningful relationships today. As one explains, lobbyists adhering to older 
practices “seem most interested in sending Christmas cards to the right people” in prominent 
political positions (Interviewee 3). By contrast, professional lobbyists stress the utility of their 
communication skills, highlighting their ability to craft policy arguments from technical 
information, or “translate business objectives into political priorities” (Interviewee 21).  
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Work ethics of professional lobbyists: transparency and honesty. Possessing 
technical expertise and skills is only one component of lobbyists’ professionalism. Strongly 
intertwined with their expertise is an espousal of specific work ethics. The promotion of these 
ethics is apparent in SEAP and EPACA codes of conduct. However, it also manifests itself in 
the shared language of individual informants who, whilst not members of these associations, 
still advocate professional lobbying. Policy officials, too, sense a shared attachment to work 
ethics. For example:  
 
“Lobbyists have developed a moral compass to guide their relations with 
European institutions.” (Interviewee 38) 
 “People like me are based here for the long-term. We have a value system 
which is neither German, French, Italian – whatever. We’ve developed a shared 
understanding of what to do, and what not to do.” (Interviewee 14) 
 
Table 4 identifies specific values that lie at the core of professional lobbyists’ work ethics and 
infuse the language they use to describe their working practices. Below, we show how 
informants consider their competence and work ethics to be inextricably linked: being a 
professional lobbyist involves delivering technical expertise transparently and honestly to 
policymakers.  
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
Transparency – or, as informants put it, being open about the interests they represent – 
is a key value of professional lobbyists. For example: “As a lobbyist, you want to be seen as 
someone who engages openly and who doesn't have a secret agenda” (Interviewee 30). For 
our informants, traditional lobbyists often “associate openness with voyeurism – they think 
anything to do with fees charged by consultancies to their clients is a private matter” 
(Interviewee 32) whilst professional lobbyists favour “setting the bar low for financial 
disclosure as lobbying needs to stand up to full public scrutiny” (ibid). Convinced lobbyists 
should be open, one informant (Interviewee 29) proudly shares that his consultancy was one 
of the first to sign the ETR, and is happy disclosing the names and income generated from 
clients. It is noteworthy that most interviewees see the ETI as an opportunity, not a threat. It is 
a chance to encourage clients publicly to disclose information on their political actions in 
Brussels. For example: “The Transparency Initiative is a good thing, it casts lights onto our 
profession, and eliminates what you might call dark lobbying” (Interviewee 29). Comparing 
the transparency of their own activities with those who endorse traditional lobbying, in-house 
informants share that certain lobbyists often choose to represent their firm’s interests through 
intermediaries. “I would never hide behind third parties” says one (Interviewee 4) adding “we 
can only be represented by our own people.” Another explains that traditional lobbyists may 
give external consultants fake business cards, allowing them to masquerade as company 
employees. They question the openness of such practices: “In the interests of transparency, 
the miner at the political coal face has got to be a company employee.” (Interviewee 39). 
A second value espoused by our informants is honesty, or – in their words – being 
truthful and accurate in statements made to EU policymakers. Honesty permeates the 
descriptions of many informants’ activities. For example: “I want to be perceived by those I 
seek to influence that I am the right person to talk to - demonstrating that I am honest is the 
right thing to do” (Interviewee 28). Most interviewees note how dishonesty underpins poor 
lobbying practice, and endorse actions taken against it. Many supported Friends of the Earth 
for triggering a complaint in 2009 that suspended an association of European chemicals firms 
from the ETR for inaccurately reporting its lobbying budget. They discuss how others’ 
dishonesty can prevent them doing their jobs. For instance, informants (Interviewees 26, 30 
and 33) express annoyance at Sunday Times journalists who, posing as lobbyists, adopted 
deceitful means to access European parliamentarians, and ultimately incited the European 
Parliament to restrict meetings between businesses and policymakers. Whilst honesty is not a 
new value per se, it gains increased importance in information-orientated lobbying where 
technical knowledge is key to accessing policymakers. Informants note that the networking 
approach to lobbying in the past was less demanding in terms of credibility compared to 
sharing technical knowledge, where information has to be supported by reliable sources. As 
such, honesty is inextricably linked with providing information to policymakers. Indeed:  
“Only 20% of my time is spent lobbying. For 80% of my time, I'm preparing for 
lobbying. By the time I get round to spending 20 minutes with a policymaker, I've 
spent 5 hours going through what I want to say and challenging my own messages: 
Are they believable? Are they true? Are they honest?” (Interviewee 30) 
Implications of Lobbying Professionalism 
As illustrated above, lobbyists in Brussels use professionalism to signal work ethics 
(transparency and honesty) and competence (political and technical expertise, and 
communication skills). But why do they want to portray themselves as knowledgeable and 
skilled individuals attached to specific work ethics? We find an answer in Table 5, which 
reports how they consider the external and internal implications of their professionalism.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
External implications of professionalism: improving reputations, gaining access. 
Lobbyists emphasise how professionalism improves their personal reputations. Presenting 
themselves as transparent, honest and competent sets them apart from – and gives them an 
advantage over – rivals in an increasingly crowded policymaking environment. A reputation 
based on ethics and competence is considered essential for securing political access. As 
lobbyists, they wish to participate in on-going policy discussions. Whilst relatively easy to 
secure first meetings with policymakers, being seen as transparent, honest and competent is 
judged crucial for engaging in continuous dialogue. For example:  
 “Politicians are only going to talk to you again if you have valuable information 
they can use to make decisions. Your information needs to be correct, not 
falsified, or altered, or tilted. Plus you need to be open about where your 
numbers come from and how your research was financed.” (Interviewee 33)  
If securing access requires delivering valid information, then work ethics matter in 
delivering useful information and maintaining access. Informants assume doors to 
policymakers would swiftly close for lobbyists with less developed work ethics.  
“It would be a killer to say anything dishonest to officials. They will kill your 
reputation. They share lobbying experiences amongst colleagues. That would 
prevent you from doing your job in future.” (Interviewee 30)  
Internal implications of professionalism: setting ethical limits, gaining legitimacy. 
When working with colleagues or clients, lobbyists use professional values to balance 
conflicts of interests. Professionalism helps them resolve dilemmas when under pressure to 
engage in practices they consider dubious. On such occasions, lobbyists deploy professional 
values to set limits on the expectations of clients or employers. For example, one consultant 
shares how she deals with clients who wish to deliver dishonest information to policymakers:  
“Why would you pass on wrong information? You should have the courage to 
say that’s not what lobbying is about. I charge you for my time, how I look at 
stuff, how I analyse it, what advice I give. Lobbying is about ‘saying no’ from 
time to time.” (EPACA, 2016)  
An in-house lobbyist discusses how he reacts whenever he is asked to cross the line and offer 
politicians more than technical information:  
“I get approached by colleagues to invite policymakers to Formula 1 races. I 
wave the SEAP code of conduct at them, saying I’m not allowed to do so.” 
(Interviewee 39) 
This setting of limits is driven by the institutional context of EU policymaking and 
reinforced by lobbyists’ understanding of compliance to institutional expectations as the 
cornerstone of maintaining access. In many ways, lobbyists are the conduits of 
policymakers’ expectations regarding appropriate lobbying. These expectations become 
the guiding principles of their work. However, translating institutional pressures into 
lobbying choices at the micro-level can lead to tension or require major effort. 
Discussing attempts to persuade colleagues to accept the ETR, one in-house lobbying 
states:   
“My most difficult lobbying exercise involved convincing internal partners to 
be transparent and disclose even marginal client confidentiality. In the end, it 
took me over three years to do so.” (Interviewee 30) 
Lobbyists also suggest that increased competence associated with lobbying professionalism 
increases their legitimacy in their organisations. This legitimacy, in turn, helps them transmit 
policymakers’ expectations about appropriate lobbying behaviour. Especially in continental 
European firms, the utility of lobbyists’ work has historically been underestimated 
(Interviewee 6 and 20). Today, however:  
“The recognition [of lobbying, through the ETR] is good for in-house lobbyists. 
It’s a way of having their work acknowledged inside their companies.” 
(Interviewee 29)  
One (Interviewee 39) explains how establishing a cross-functional ‘European Affairs’ team 
helped him showcase his EU knowledge and political skills and convince sceptical R&D 
engineers that his professional lobbying approach could benefit the firm. Another reveals that 
she visited her firm's sites to explain to colleagues how her professional knowledge and skills 
could create value (Interviewee 24). Whilst such efforts at using professionalism to build 
legitimacy take time, they can ultimately bear fruit. For example:  
“I still have to explain to colleagues what I do and why it’s important. But with 
time, it gets easier. I have lots of knowledge and success stories to show what 
my professional role can do.” (Interviewee 30) 
Discussion  
As EU policymaking becomes more complex and EU institutions have higher expectations 
about transparency, lobbyists in Brussels have to demonstrate competence, openness and 
honesty. Figure 2 presents the model of professional lobbying practice derived from our data 
and highlights implications of lobbying professionalism for business and society. Below, we 
discuss how our study contributes to existing CPA research in three ways.   
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
Professionalism as the Essence of Ethical Lobbying 
We shed new light onto what constitutes ethical or responsible in relation to CPA. Existing 
studies grounded primarily in a normative ethics perspective (Fischer, 2004) are theoretically 
sophisticated (Anastasiadis, 2014; Bauer, 2017; Hamilton & Hoch, 1997; Keffer & Hill, 1997; 
Oberman, 2004; Ostas, 2007). However, they lack conceptual clarity around what ethical or 
responsible forms of lobbying entail. We remedy this issue by adopting a descriptive ethics 
perspective (Fischer, 2004) which engages with the narratives of lobbying practitioners and 
how they describe the principles guiding their work. Our analysis – informed by rich 
qualitative data – reveals that being ethical and being responsible are associated with 
professionalism, a multi-dimensional concept which combines work ethics and competence. 
Prior research (e.g. Coen & Vannoni, 2018; McGrath, 2005; Rival & Major, 2018) 
acknowledges the rise of professional government affairs, but remains silent about what it 
means for lobbyists to be professional. Our study responds to this limitation by applying 
insights from the long theoretical tradition of the sociology of the professions to unpack how 
being professional is understood by lobbying practitioners themselves. We suggest that, in the 
context of EU lobbying, being professional implies (i) promoting values of transparency and 
honesty and (ii) developing technical and political competence, and combining these two 
cornerstones of professionalism in order to be able to (iii) create value for clients without 
engaging in potentially dubious lobbying practice and (iv) develop a personal reputation to 
obtain and maintain political access by creating value for policy officials. 
Our finding that lobbying professionalism involves competence echoes prior research 
(e.g. Bouwen, 2004; Coen & Vannoni, 2018; Taminia & Wilts, 2006) demonstrating that EU-
level lobbying has developed into a specialist activity requiring high levels of technical and 
industry expertise. More novel, we believe, is our finding that being professional also 
involves being transparent and honest about the interests lobbyists represent. Ultimately, 
technical information, honesty and transparency are interlinked and are manifested in 
professional conduct, which relies not only on adding value to employers and clients but also 
on doing so under conditions largely set by policymakers’ expectations. 
Enabling Conditions of Lobbying Professionalism: Institutional Factors Activated by 
Individual Actors 
Our research also contributes to research examining factors that shape different approaches to 
lobbying. Lobbying in general (e.g. Woll, 2012) as well as deliberative (Locke & Seele, 2016) 
and more responsible (e.g. Bauer, 2017) or transparent (e.g. Greenwood, 2011) forms of 
lobbying can be determined by the context in which they are practiced. Our study stretches 
such understandings by suggesting that the promotion of any approach to lobbying cannot be 
explained by macro-level institutional factors alone. Instead, individual lobbyists can be 
important actors who activate institutional pressures (Greif, 2006) by interpreting and 
transmitting institutional meaning (Czarniawska, 1997) to clients or employers.  
Our study points to the concept of professionalism as a key construct, at the individual 
level, depicting how institutional environments shape the guiding principles of practitioners 
and how practitioners can put these principles in action. Like other professionals, individual 
lobbyists can act as carriers (e.g. Muzio et al., 2013) of institutional pressures to adopt 
specific behaviours. On the one hand, our informants interpret increased complexity and the 
‘transparency turn’ in EU-level policymaking as a need to lobby professionally (indeed, more 
responsibly or ethically) by providing technical expertise in a transparent and honest manner. 
On the other, being an institutional carrier can also involve reproducing these guiding 
principles in organisations by setting limits on client and employer expectations. Acting as 
institutional carriers, at the end of the day, allows practitioners of professional lobbying to 
serve private interests in ways that do not compromise EU governance.  
The qualitative nature of our study prevents us from measuring the extent to which 
lobbyists enact these guiding principles. It does enable us, however, to document the (often 
contested) translation of institutional pressures into lobbying choices by individual lobbyists 
at the micro-level. Our research points to intra-organisational tensions (such as between 
institutional requirements and corporate cultures) that this behavioural adaptation may 
involve. It suggests that individual lobbyists face dual pressures stemming from both the 
policymaking arena and the organisations they represent. They have to walk a fine line 
between the two: understanding, bringing together and – if necessary – reconciling 
institutional and organisational expectations. Although individual lobbyists need to promote 
their clients’ interests, they may not do so unconditionally. Our findings that they say no to 
clients’ requests to transmit inaccurate information to policymakers, or refuse colleagues’ 
demands to invite elected officials to sports events, suggests that individual lobbyists – like 
other professionals (Koehn, 1994) – can and often do handle these potential tensions by 
mobilising value and competence claims to set limits on their clients’ and employers’ 
expectations.  
Implications of Lobbying Professionalism for Business and Society 
Finally, our research builds on CPA scholarship by sketching out the implications of 
professionalism in lobbying for business and broader society. For businesses, our study 
echoes existing research (e.g. Doh et al., 2014) suggesting that more responsible approaches 
to lobbying are important for gaining and maintaining political access (Wilts 2006) and 
developing long-term relationships with legislators (Fouirnaies & Hall 2014). Building on 
these studies, we explore what it takes to maintain political access and identify the main 
actors engaged in such activities. Our research suggests that those individuals involved in 
delivering firms’ political strategies on a day-to-day basis at the political frontline are most 
often those who strive to secure political access. We suggest firms may enhance their political 
access by recruiting in-house or hired lobbyists who enjoy a reputation amongst policymakers 
for being ‘professional’ and, thus, offering in an honest and transparent way technical 
expertise which is valuable when making political decisions.  
Our study also points to broader societal implications of lobbying professionalism. 
Lobbyists have potential to make significant differences for policy, either causing harm or 
improving governance in the systems where they operate (Tyllström & Murray, 2019). In an 
era marked by a professionalisation of politics where an ability to navigate political systems 
makes policy actors – including lobbyists – employable across a variety of organisations 
(Selling & Syllfors, 2019), our informants’ espousal of professionalism may be considered 
self-interested: being politically skilled and competent is ultimately important for their career 
progression. However, if increased transparency is assumed to be a good thing for the 
democratic legitimacy of the European policy making (e.g. Bunea & Gross, 2019), then 
lobbyists’ attachment to professional values and their attempts at instilling them amongst their 
firms or clients enhances the legitimacy of EU governance. 
Concluding Remarks 
Our study aimed to investigate how individual lobbyists understand their work and what they 
personally consider professionalism implies for their day-to-day work. We explore how 
practitioners understand the ethical dimensions of their work, trace the origins of these 
understandings, and expose how they act as guiding principles in their professional life. Our 
descriptive ethics approach exposes professionalism in lobbying – based on delivering 
technical competence to policymakers in a transparent and honest way – as an alternative but 
complementary approach to responsible (Anastasiadis et al., 2018; Bauer, 2017) or 
deliberative lobbying (Locke & Seele, 2016). It can be difficult to articulate what it means to 
be ethical or responsible when lobbying. By contrast, our research – drawing on the rich 
sociological tradition of professions-based research – usefully indicates what it means to be 
professional (technically competent, transparent and honest) and how lobbyists are expected 
to behave in this way towards clients, political audiences and democratic processes.  
Whilst pressures to adopt a more transparent and honest approach to lobbying stem 
from the European institutions, our research illuminates the key role that individual lobbyists 
can play in the broader dissemination of such lobbying practices, which have potential to 
benefit both business and society or, at least, be considered largely conducive to democratic 
processes. Prior research focuses on the influence of individuals on the formulation and 
delivery of outward-facing strategies designed to mobilise political support for firms’ interests 
(e.g. Coen & Vannoni, 2018; Rudy & Johnson, 2019; Tyllström & Murray, 2019; Wilts, 
2006). Interestingly, our own study brings into focus the role of individual lobbyists in 
inward-facing activities conducted to ensure firms’ compliance with societal expectations.  
Like all studies, ours is not without its limitations. Our empirical focus on the Brussels 
context prevents us from generalising whether lobbyists working in other institutional settings 
similarly associate their work with professionalism. If they do, then professionalism may be 
underlined by values other than transparency and honesty and associated with different limits 
that professionals need to impose on employers or clients if they are to enact this 
professionalism. Further studies, focused on other policymaking arenas, are necessary to 
enhance our understandings of the professional dimensions in lobbyists’ work. Moreover, 
efforts to promote more political transparency in Brussels are relatively recent. Future 
longitudinal studies will be needed to ascertain the extent to which Brussels-based lobbyists' 
claims to openness and honesty are broadly enacted, and evaluate whether they have longer-
term impact, not only on firms' political actions, but also on transparency in the processes of 
EU governance.  
Our research elucidates the key role that lobbyists can play as they interpret 
institutional expectations regarding appropriate lobbying behaviour, and transmit these 
expectations to the organisations whose interests they represent. Further research could 
explore this role in more detail by investigating more closely the mechanisms that lobbyists 
use to instil principles of transparency and honesty amongst clients or employers. In exploring 
these enactment activities, scholars could follow the example of Tyllström & Murray (2019) 
to determine whether lobbyists actively, reactively or proactively subscribe to 
professionalism, and consider how their level of attachment influences their motivation and 
ability to disseminate professional lobbying practices in organisations. 
Future research could also further explore the effectiveness of lobbying 
professionalism. Our informants believe that transparency, honesty and technical expertise are 
crucial for lobbying success. It would be interesting to explore in more detail how public 
officials perceive such an approach. Further studies are required to ascertain whether lobbyists 
who act with professional behaviours achieve superior policy outcomes to those who may 
have other behaviours.  
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Figure 1: Data structure  
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Figure 2: A model of professional lobbying in Brussels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Description of sample 
Interviewee Date Experience (years) Nationality Organisation Sector 
1 Oct 2013 8 German Firm Insurance 
2 Oct 2013 3 French Firm Electronics 
3 Oct 2013 6 German Firm Energy 
4 Oct 2013 14 German Firm Automotive 
5 Oct 2013 3 German Firm Electronics 
6 Oct 2013 4 German Firm Logistics 
7 Oct 2013 23 French Firm Aerospace/defence 
8 Oct 2013 19 French Firm Aerospace/defence 
9 Oct 2013 5 German Firm Technical inspection 
10 Oct 2013 13 French Firm Automotive 
11 Oct 2013 2 French Firm Automotive 
12 Oct 2013 9 French Firm Multi-sector 
13 Oct 2013 12 French Firm Aerospace/defence 
14 Oct 2013 6 German Firm Multi-sector 
15 Oct 2013 4 French Firm Energy 
16 Oct 2013 5 German Firm Logistics 
17 Nov 2013 4 French Firm Fashion/textiles 
18 Nov 2013 3 French Firm Electronics 
19 Nov 2013 13 German Firm Agriculture 
20 Nov 2013 3 French Firm Banking 
21 Nov 2013 8 French Firm Multi-sector 
22 Nov 2013 6 French Firm Automotive 
23 Nov 2013 3 French Firm Logistics 
24 Nov 2013 8 German Firm Aerospace/defence 
25 Nov 2013 7 German Firm Multi-sector 
26 Apr 2014 7 British Consultancy Public affairs 
27 Apr 2014 12 French  Consultancy Public affairs 
28 Apr 2014 12 Swedish Consultancy Public affairs 
29 May 2016 15 French Consultancy Public affairs 
30 May 2016 15 Dutch Firm Law 
31 May 2016 4 German NGO Government 
32 May 2016 12 Dutch Firm Construction 
33 June 2016 9 British Association Public affairs 
34 June 2016 14 Swedish Association Public affairs 
35 June 2016 2 British NGO Government 
36 June 2016 3 Spanish Consultancy Public affairs 
37 June 2016 7 Swedish EC Government 
38 June 2016 8 German EC Government 
39 Aug 2016 17 British Firm Automotive 
 
1 European Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Data sources and use 
 
Data source Type of data Use of data in analysis 
 
Intensive stages of data collection 
 
Interviews October 2013 – April 2014: 
25 in-house corporate lobbyists 
3 consultants 
 
Understand working practices of lobbyists in 
Brussels 
 
 May – August 2016: 
3 in-house corporate lobbyists 
2 consultants 
2 professional association representatives 
2 policymakers 
2 NGO representatives 
 
Understand development of lobbying as an 
occupation in Brussels 
 
Gain deep understanding of changes in work 
practices of Brussels-based lobbyists 
 
Identify knowledge, skills and values 
involved in Brussels-based lobbying 
 
Understand importance of professionalism for 
Brussels-based lobbyists 
 
Archival 15 official documents on lobbying 
regulation issued by the European 
institutions 
 
15 position papers issued by SEAP and 
EPACA 
 
3 press interviews with SEAP and 
EPACA representatives 
 
Websites of EPACA, SEAP, Alter-EU, 
CCBE, the European Commission 
 
Triangulate evidence derived from interviews 
 
On-going data collection (2013-2018) 
 
Informal 
conversations 
Regular, informal conversations with 
lobbying practitioners in Brussels 
 
Share initial findings and obtain feedback 
Archival Specialist press articles on European 
lobbying and the Transparency Initiative 
 
Gain deep understanding of changes in work 
practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The competence of lobbyists – representative quotes 
 
Political expertise Technical expertise Communication skills Distancing from 
traditional lobbyists 
through competence 
claims 
  
“[Lobbyists today need 
to] understand the 
different institutions, and 
recognise for which 
different legal, economic 
and political aspects of 
the EU they are 
responsible” (In-house 
lobbyist, October 2013). 
 
“A good lobbyist knows 
people in the room 
[where political 
decisions are made], has 
already spoken to them – 
even two years before 
the meeting takes place.” 
(In-house lobbyist, June 
2016) 
 
“[Lobbyists today] really 
need to know the most 
appropriate route for 
accessing EU 
policymakers. You need 
to judge when it’s best to 
contact a policy official 
alone, in a business 
association, or as part of 
an ad hoc coalition” (In-
house lobbyists, 
November 2013) 
 
 
 
“Being a good EU 
lobbyist means I have to 
be well connected in my 
firm to get access to the 
specialist information I 
need to participate in 
increasingly technical 
policy debates” (In-
house lobbyist, October 
2013).  
 
“A good lobbyist can 
always bring to the table 
something that policy-
makers cannot obtain 
anywhere else. So, you 
come with unique 
information which is 
also evidence-based and 
you can prove what you 
are saying.” (In-house 
lobbyist, June 2016) 
  
“There’s no other way 
for lobbyists to survive 
today unless they are at 
the top of their 
competencies and 
abilities, and if they can 
provide institutions with 
the technical expertise 
requested from them.” 
(Policy official, May 
2015) 
 
 
“I’ve attended meetings 
where lobbyists launch 
into stuff and completely 
confuse the person they’re 
talking to because they’re 
not using the right 
language skills and not 
explaining themselves well 
because they are too in-
depth” (Consultant, June 
2016). 
 
“I personally spend more 
time reading the 
documents, identifying 
topics that are important 
for my colleagues, and 
explaining their 
importance in a language 
they’ll understand” (In-
house lobbyist, April 
2016). 
 
“You have to have a very 
detailed understanding of 
issues and be able to 
convey these to a wide 
variety of different people 
at different levels of 
hierarchy in different 
institutions” (Consultant, 
May 2016). 
  
“[There is] a difference 
between what I’d call an 
old school and a new 
school lobbying. Old 
school lobbying was 
about wining and 
dining, about 
networking, about being 
an ambassador for your 
organisation. New 
school lobbying is a 
more regulatory 
approach, dealing with 
actual content, trying to 
add value and 
improving the bottom 
line.” (In-house 
lobbyist, October 2013) 
 
“I personally spend 
more time [than my 
predecessor] reading the 
documents, identifying 
topics that are important 
for my colleagues, and 
explaining their 
importance in a 
language they’ll 
understand” (In-house 
lobbyist, April 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The work ethics of lobbyists – representative quotes 
 
Transparency Honesty Distancing from traditional 
lobbyists through value claims 
 
“As a lobbyist, you want to be seen 
as someone who engages openly 
and who doesn't have a secret 
agenda” (In-house lobbyist, May 
2016) 
 
“I really doubt that there are 
lobbyists or corporations offering 
money to parliamentarians to make 
an amendment. But you know what, 
it's because it's not actually needed. 
You approach officials with 
arguments.” (In-house lobbyist, 
June 2016) 
 
“Authenticity is key, surely? I’m 
fine with externalising the 
acquisition of data, or even the 
setting up meetings with 
stakeholders. But, in the interests of 
transparency, the miner at the coal 
face has got to be a company 
employee.” (In-house lobbying, 
May 2016). 
 
 
  
“As good lobbyists, we wish to be 
perceived in a good light. If we 
can demonstrate that we are 
ethical and the right people to 
speak to and honest and 
trustworthy by having a code of 
ethics, then that’s the right thing 
to do.” (Consultant, May 2016) 
 
“Only 20% of my time is spent 
lobbying. For 80% of my time, 
I'm preparing for lobbying. So, by 
the time I get round to spending 
20 minutes with an MEP, I've 
spent at least five hours preparing 
for the meeting. In those five 
hours, I go through what I want to 
say and challenge my own 
messages:  Are they believable? 
Are they serious? Are they true? 
Are they honest?” (In-house 
lobbyist, May 2016) 
 
 
 
 
“[Traditional lobbyists] often 
associate openness with 
voyeurism – they think, for 
example, that anything to do with 
fees charged by consultancies to 
their clients is a private matter. 
[My approach favours] setting the 
bar very low for financial 
disclosure as lobbying needs to 
stand up to full public scrutiny.” 
(In-house lobbyist, October 2013) 
 
“Lobbyists today are really well 
educated in terms of work ethics. 
They are also very well trained on 
ethical issues. The moral aspects 
of lobbying work are important to 
lobbyists today.” (Consultant, 
May 2016) 
 
“Lobbyists have a moral compass 
to guide their relations with the 
European institutions. (Policy 
official, May 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Implications of lobbying professionalism 
 
External implications:  
Improving reputation and gaining political access 
Internal implications:  
Gaining legitimacy and setting ethical limits 
 
Competence 
 
Values 
 
Competence 
 
Values 
 
“To be a successful 
lobbyist, you really have 
to provide useful 
information - early, and 
often. You always need 
to send legislators or 
regulators some 
additional information 
after meetings. Do a bit 
of homework. Give them 
more useful information. 
That's always welcome. 
The door always remains 
open for anybody who 
engages seriously in this 
way.” (In-house lobbyist, 
May 2016). 
 
“If you stop providing 
useful information, 
there's no way of going 
back […]” (In-house 
lobbyist, May 2016) 
 
“What we are doing is 
creating a continuous 
dialogue with officials to 
make sure we are part of 
a discussion. I think if 
you do it badly the first 
time you meet, policy 
makers are not going to 
invite you to continue the 
discussion. I always tell 
my clients that it's fairly 
easy to get your first 
meeting; the trick is to 
get your second” 
(Consultant, April 2014) 
"It would be completely 
a killer to do or say 
anything dishonest to 
officials. They will kill 
your reputation. They 
share their lobbying 
experiences amongst 
colleagues. That would 
prevent you from doing 
your job in the future" 
(In-house lobbyist, June 
2016) 
 
“If I lied and cheated I 
wouldn't get the trust I 
need to do my job. You 
are found out. You 
would burn your 
reputation very quickly. 
For me, trust is the key 
currency for a lobbyist. 
You earn policy-makers’ 
trust by being incredibly 
professional” (In-house 
lobbyist, May 2016). 
 
“Getting caught not 
telling the truth would 
have a huge impact on 
your lobbying activities 
here in Brussels" (In-
house lobbyist, May 
2016) 
 
“Your information needs 
to be correct, not 
falsified, or altered, or 
tilted or anything like 
that. And you need to be 
open about where your 
numbers come from and 
how the research was 
financed” (In-house 
lobbyist, June 2016). 
“I still have to explain to 
my colleagues what I do 
and why it's important. 
They don't have a natural 
affinity with lobbying. 
But with time, it gets 
easier and easier. I have 
a lot of knowledge and a 
lot of success stories to 
show what my role can 
be do” (In-house 
lobbyist, May 2016). 
 
“The fact that there is 
some kind of recognition 
[of lobbying, through the 
European Transparency 
Register] is good for in-
house lobbyists. It’s very 
positive for them because 
it’s a way of having their 
work acknowledged 
inside their companies. 
It’s especially important 
in continental European 
countries, where 
lobbying is not always 
seen as strategic, but 
rather as a cost” 
(Consultant, May 2016). 
 
“I went out and I visited 
(colleagues in the firm’s 
business divisions). I had 
a very clear plan – I 
needed to know the 
business units, and I also 
needed to explain how 
my knowledge can create 
value for them” (In-
house lobbyist, April 
2017). 
 
“I’ve been approached 
by colleagues to invite 
specific policy-makers to 
Formula One races. I 
wave the SEAP code of 
conduct at them, saying 
that I’m not allowed to 
do so” (In-house 
lobbyist, August 2016). 
 
“Probably the most 
difficult lobbying 
exercise I’ve ever had to 
do in my life involved 
convincing a bunch of 
internal partners about 
the need to be transparent 
and disclose even 
marginal client 
confidentiality. In the 
end, it took me above 
three years to do so.” (In-
house lobbyist, June 
2016)  
 
“We’ve decided not to 
work with certain sectors 
– like weapons, tobacco 
and alcohol. It’s not a 
question of legality. It’s a 
kind of regulation we 
apply to ourselves. It’s 
nothing to do with the 
law, nothing to do with 
codes of conduct. It’s a 
personal point of view. 
We don’t want to work 
with them.” (Consultant, 
May 2016) 
 
 
